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37 
ASK ME NO QUESTIONS AND  
I’LL TELL YOU NO LIES1: 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FALSEHOODS  
IN BALLOT QUESTION CAMPAIGNS 
Michelle Roberts* 
 
American voters have come to expect exaggeration, distortion, and 
mudslinging in political campaigns, but do campaigners have a First 
Amendment right to blatantly lie—to simply make up false statistics and 
“facts”?  A recent appellate court suggests that lying is permissible in 
initiative and referendum campaigns.  However, providing constitutional 
protection for such statements undermines the most compelling 
justification for the right to free speech: preservation of enlightened self-
government.  Voters cannot be expected to govern wisely or in accordance 
with their consciences when they are subjected to a barrage of lies.  The 
Supreme Court already recognizes discrete areas where free speech rights 
are curtailed because of significant personal or public interests in protecting 
reputations, consumer choices, and governmental processes.  Likewise, the 
Court should recognize that falsehoods told with actual malice in ballot 
campaigns are exempt from First Amendment protection. 
 
                                                          
1.  BING CROSBY AND THE ANDREWS SISTERS, Ask Me No Questions (And I’ll Tell You 
No Lies), on THEIR COMPLETE RECORDINGS TOGETHER (MCA Records 1996).  A version of the 
phrase seems to have originated with “Ask me no questions, and I’ll tell you no fibs” in Act III of 
Oliver Goldsmith’s 1773 play, SHE STOOPS TO CONQUER.  E.g., JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR 
QUOTATIONS:  A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR 
SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 401 (10th ed. 1919).  The phrase has proved 
popular with generations of musicians.  E.g., B.B. KING, Ask Me No Questions, on INDIANOLA 
MISSISSIPPI SEEDS (MCA 1970); LYNYRD SKYNYRD, Don’t Ask Me No Questions, on SECOND 
HELPING (MCA 1974).  
 *  J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School.  With whole-hearted thanks to 
Professors John T. Nockleby and Justin Levitt, both of whom generously offered advice and 
insight in the drafting process, and to the editors and staff of Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment 
Law Review, who tirelessly combed through the details to get the article publication-ready. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When Pinocchio failed to heed warnings that he should not lie, the 
consequences were swift and undeniable.2  Pinocchio’s animated nose tip 
jutted ever farther from his face as branches sprouted from it.3  “You see, 
Pinocchio, a lie keeps growing and growing until it’s as plain as the nose 
on your face,” the fairy explained.4  Unfortunately, in the world of adult 
politics, the lies are not so plain.  A substantial number of voters admitted 
to encountering false information in the previous election cycle, and despite 
this knowledge, poll data indicated “strong evidence that voters were 
substantially misinformed” about many prominent election issues.5 
In an effort to deter lying in political campaigns, at least sixteen states 
have enacted laws making it illegal to make or publish false statements 
intended to influence political campaigns (“falsehood statutes”).6  While 
the statutes do not all explicitly prohibit false statements “of fact,” it is 
implicit that the regulations apply to facts since those are the only kinds of 
statements that would be provably false.7  Of the sixteen states with 
falsehood statutes, nine specifically outlaw such statements in ballot 
                                                          
2.  See Pinocchio (1940), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/media/rm1513393664/tt0032910 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (showing his lengthy nose as a result of lying).  
3.  Id. 
4.  Memorable Quotes for Pinocchio (1940), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0032910 
/quotes (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).  
5.  CLAY RAMSAY ET AL., MISINFORMATION AND THE 2010 ELECTION:  A STUDY OF THE 
US ELECTORATE 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/dec10 
/Misinformation_Dec10_rpt.pdf.  
6.  E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-109 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 
(West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 42 
(West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (West 
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-301 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274 (2011); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 16.1-10-24 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  §§ 3517.21–3517.22 (LexisNexis 2011); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532 (West 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142 (2011); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.335 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-8-1 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN § 12.05 (West 2011). 
7.  E.g., Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1981) (finding that a precursor 
statute to Minnesota Statute Section 211B.06 was directed at false factual statements and not at 
extreme inferences such as voting “no” on the budget demonstrates lack of support for any of the 
individual items in the budget); B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., No. 4-6385-17049-CV, 2006 WL 
954093, at *2 (Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 10, 2006)  (requiring evidence of factual 
misrepresentation before determining whether there is a prima facie showing for a Minnesota 
Statute Section 211B.06 complaint).  
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question campaigns.8  While most of the prohibitions have been on the 
books for years, recent court rulings have raised questions about whether 
such prohibitions are constitutional.9 
The rulings suggest that partisans in ballot campaigns have a 
constitutional right to blatantly lie, regardless of the consequences to the 
electoral process.10  An Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling on a 
Minnesota statute prohibiting falsehoods told with actual malice in 
initiative and referendum campaigns illustrates this point.11  In 281 Care 
Committee v. Arneson, the Eighth Circuit determined that, as a content-
based regulation,12 Minnesota Statute Section 211B.06 should be analyzed 
under “strict scrutiny.”13  Because the Minnesota statute failed to survive 
strict scrutiny, it was declared unconstitutional and unenforceable for all 
practical purposes.14  The Minnesota challenge was not the only one to 
such laws; a challenge to a substantively similar law in Ohio was filed on 
the heels of the appellate court’s 281 Care Committee decision.15 
                                                          
8.  E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-109 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
18:1463 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 42 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
211B.06 (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-24 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
3517.21–3517.22 (LexisNexis 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532 (West 2011); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN § 12.05 (West 2011).  Another seven 
states have similar prohibitions directed at making false statements with regard to candidates 
only.  E.g.,  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (West 
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-301 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274 (2011); WASH. 
REV. CODE. § 42.17A.335 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-1 (West 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-19-142 (2011).  
9.  E.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 61 (2012); COAST Candidates PAC v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 1:11cv775,  
2012 WL 4322517 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2012).  The latter case was dismissed due to lack of 
standing. COAST Candidates, 2012 WL 4322517, at *5.  
10.  See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 633–34 (finding that “knowingly false campaign 
speech” is not “outside the protections of the First Amendment”).  
11.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d. 621.  
12.  16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 827 (2011) (defining content-based regulation as 
“laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of ideas 
or views expressed”).  
13.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 633–34.  Strict scrutiny test requires a compelling state 
interest and a narrowly tailored statute to serve that interest for a regulation to be deemed 
constitutional. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  
14.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d 621; see also Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S at 818 
(noting that content-based speech regulations will rarely be found permissible because they risk 
silencing dissent and stifling individuality).  
15.  Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, COAST Candidates PAC v. 
Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 1:11cv775, 2012 WL 4322517 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2012).  
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Unfortunately, despite the presence of important legal questions with 
significant public policy implications, the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
on the last day of the previous term.16  The Supreme Court should have 
settled the issue by properly weighing all of the competing interests at 
stake, including potential damage to the democratic processes that the 
First Amendment17 is designed to protect.18  For guidance, the Court 
should have looked to other regulated areas like defamation and perjury, 
where other significant interests outweigh free speech rights.19 By taking 
this approach, the Court would have recognized that falsehoods told with 
actual malice20 in ballot campaigns should be categorically exempt from 
First Amendment protection. 
This Article argues that a limited categorical exemption for knowing 
and reckless falsehoods told in ballot campaigns is appropriate in light of 
the important democratic issues at stake and the structural space for free 
speech provided by narrow application of the laws.  Part II discusses the 
history of First Amendment protections for political speech and the 
Amendment’s relationship to the electoral process.  Part III analyzes the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in 281 Care Committee and the law that the court 
relied upon in its decision.  Part IV provides a summary of how speech has 
been constitutionally regulated in other areas, and advocates the regulation 
of lying in the context of ballot campaigns. 
                                                          
16.  Arneson v. 281 Care Comm., 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).  
17.  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”).  
18.  See Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Governance Value, 14 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1251, 1253 (2006) (noting “‘democratic participation’” is frequently cited as the 
First Amendment’s purpose).  
19.  See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that 
despite the First Amendment’s protection, a public official may recover for defamation if false 
statements were made with actual malice because of the necessity of vigorous public debates and 
discouragement of self-censorship); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) 
(Kennedy, J., plurality) (noting that perjured statements are not warranted First Amendment 
protection because “[p]erjury undermines the function and province of the law and threatens the 
integrity of judgments that are the basis of the legal system”) (citing United States v. Dunnigan, 
507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993)).  
20.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 (defining a statement with “actual malice” as one made 
“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”).  
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II.  HISTORICAL DEFERENCE FOR FREE SPEECH COLLIDES WITH 
COMPELLING INTEREST IN PREVENTING CAMPAIGN FALSEHOODS 
While four values have been said to underpin the guarantees of the 
First Amendment—”self-realization, truth-seeking, democratic participation 
and social adaptability”— judges most frequently invoke democratic 
participation as the driving purpose in their First Amendment decisions.21  
Political speech is central to the historical and modern purpose of the First 
Amendment.22  In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the 
Supreme Court discussed the First Amendment’s “fullest and most urgent 
application” to campaign speech.23  The Court underscored that “[t]he right 
of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach 
consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary 
means to protect it.”24  This prerequisite to enlightened democracy prevents 
temporary majorities from exercising the power to determine not only right 
and wrong, but also true and false.25  “No other nation claims as fierce and 
stringent a system of legal protection for speech.”26 
Courts, however, sometimes give insufficient weight to the 
government’s interest in protecting the electoral process itself.27  They 
overlook the fact that even the most basic rights are illusory if the right to 
vote and self-determine are impaired.28  They fail to balance what Justice 
Breyer recognized as the tension between the ability to engage in as much 
speech as one wants and public confidence in the electoral process.29 
Despite the insufficient weight given to concerns for the electoral 
process over the years, states have a legitimate interest in protecting the 
                                                          
21.  Murchison, supra note 18.  
22.  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 892 (2010).  
23.  Id. at 898.  
24.  Id.  
25.  281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,  
133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).  
26.  Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:  A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 225, 229 (1992).  
27.  Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 889, 891 (2008).  
28.  See id. at 897 (stating that once the public becomes distrustful of campaign 
advertising, the “integrity of the election process” is undermined).  
29.  Justice Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture:  Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 245, 253 (2002) (discussing this tension in the context of campaign finance limitations).  
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integrity of the electoral process.30  The Supreme Court has recognized that 
state interest, even as it has moved to curtail speech regulations.31  For 
example, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, although the Court 
struck down a law prohibiting anonymous campaign speech, it recognized 
that the state had a legitimate interest in preventing fraud and libel in 
campaigns where false statements might have “serious adverse 
consequences” for a voting public that could not fairly evaluate the 
proposed law before it.32  Specifically, the McIntyre leaflet urged citizens 
to vote against a school tax levy in order to stop “wast[ing] . . .  taxpayer 
dollars.”33  Yet, the distributor of the pamphlets was not accused of 
promoting factual inaccuracies, but only of violating the anonymous speech 
statute.34  In ruling that anonymous speech could not be prohibited, the 
Court noted that Ohio had already addressed fraud concerns by enacting 
other statutes prohibiting dissemination of falsehoods about candidates and 
issue-driven ballot measures.35  Those statutes were quoted by the Court as 
part of its reasoning in reaching its holding,36 and incidentally, were very 
similar to Minnesota statute section 211B.06.37 
Concern about adverse consequences in elections—namely that voters 
will be deceived into casting ballots based on false information—may be 
even more acute in an age when fraud and misinformation spread faster and 
farther than it ever could have without modern technology.38  Ideally, 
voters would carefully consider and educate themselves on ballot measures 
                                                          
30.  E.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995).  
31.  Id.; Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982).  
32.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349.  
33.  Id. at 337 n.2.  
34.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 338; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1988), 
repealed by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.21–3517.22 (West 2011).  
35.  The Court specifically mentioned OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3599.09.1(B)–
3599.09.2(B) (West 1988).  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349.  
36.  Id. at 349–51.  
37.  Compare § 3599.09.1(B) (banning general publication advocating for a certain 
candidate or position if there is no name or contact information of the individual or group 
responsible for the message), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011) (making it a gross 
misdemeanor for a person to be involved in the preparation or dissemination of a publication that 
promotes a false message).  
38.  See Terri R. Day, “Nasty as They Wanna Be” Politics:  Clean Campaigning and the 
First Amendment, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 647, 649 (2009) (noting the oft-cited concern about 
technology’s ability to spread negative material).  
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to prepare for Election Day; however, reality often defies that aspiration.39  
Many voters are instead at the mercy of television advertising.40  
Furthermore, even if voters wanted to educate themselves, many ballot 
measures are technical and complicated.41  The lengthy explanatory voter 
pamphlets are of little help because the reading skills required to 
understand the proposed laws are too high for many;42 roughly fourteen and 
a half percent of Americans lack the ability to read anything more than 
short, commonplace prose.43  Lastly, the ability of fast-paced digital media 
to turn negative campaign statements into overnight “tidal waves” further 
confuses voters and fuels fear that the electoral process is compromised by 
“pervasive and exaggerated mud-slinging.”44 
Polls indicate that this concern is warranted.45  Campaign 
misinformation and the perception of misinformation have a measurable 
effect on voters.46  In a 2010 study conducted by the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, researchers 
found that a substantial quantity of voters encountered misleading 
information in the 2010 election.47  Perhaps more importantly, researchers 
found strong evidence that although voters recognized some information as 
false, they continued to remain substantially misinformed about prominent 
issues.48  For example, only a small percentage of respondents accurately 
                                                          
39.  Becky Kruse, The Truth in Masquerade:  Regulating False Ballot Proposition Ads 
Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CAL. L. REV. 129, 130 (2001).  
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. at 144.  
42.  A study of California ballot initiatives from 1974 to 1980, for example, found that the 
voter pamphlet explanation reading levels are well beyond the high school graduate level and 
sometimes beyond college graduate level.  Id. at 145.  
43.  Institute of Education Sciences, National Assessment of Adult Literacy:  State & 
County Estimates of Low Literacy, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 
http://nces.ed.gov/naal/estimates/Overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).  
44.  Day, supra note 38, at 649.  
45.  See generally RAMSAY ET. AL., supra note 5, at 2 (outlining the key findings of the 
study); Dana Blanton, Fox News Poll:  24 Percent Believe Obama Not Born in U.S., FOX NEWS 
(Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/04/07/fox-news-poll-24-percent-believe-
obama-born/ (reporting that one-quarter of voters still believe President Obama is not a natural-
born citizen).  
46.  See generally RAMSAY ET. AL., supra note 5, at 4–15 (detailing the effects of 
campaign misinformation on key issues, including the stimulus legislation, health care reform and 
climate change).  
47.  Id. at 3.  
48.  Id. at 4–15.  
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stated what economists had been saying about recession stimulus funding 
approved by Congress.49  The misinformation was so pervasive that the 
respondents’ varying levels of education had little impact on their ability to 
differentiate truthful statements from false ones.50 
The danger of misinformed and misled voters may be even more 
disconcerting in the direct democracy of ballot measure campaigns, where 
voters are, in effect, legislators.51 Currently, twenty-four states permit 
direct democracy in the form of referendums or initiatives, and all fifty 
states allow legislatures to refer questions to voters, who then make law by 
approving or disapproving of policy or taxes.52  In essence, voters have 
become “a fourth branch of government.”53  Unlike the other branches of 
government, however, these citizen-legislators do not have aides and 
advisors to assist them in deciphering the accurate and pertinent 
information needed to make decisions.54  Problems like poor drafting, a 
confusing number of ballot questions, ineffective voter education, and the 
failure of voters to account for a law’s effects already plague direct 
democracy.55  Some ballot measures are even “drawn to confuse voters into 
voting ‘incorrectly’—in a manner at odds with their [political] 
preferences.”56  Given all these challenges and voters’ susceptibility to 
misinformation, states should be permitted to regulate those who attempt to 
intentionally deceive citizen legislators.  Minnesota statute section 211B.06 
and similar laws are just such an effort to address these concerns.57 
                                                          
49.  Id. at 5.  
50.  Id.  
51.  See Christopher A. Coury, Note, Direct Democracy Through Initiative and 
Referendum:  Checking the Balance, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 573, 573 (1994) 
(noting that drafters of state constitutions included referendum and initiative powers in the 
constitutions because they “intended to empower the people to introduce, consider, and vote upon 
issues themselves”).  
52.  What are ballot propositions, initiatives, and referendums?, INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM INSTITUTE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%20What%20is%20I&R.htm (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2013).  
53.  Coury, supra note 51, at 574.  
54.  Kruse, supra note 39, at 157–58.  
55.  Coury, supra note 51, at 574.  
56.  Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 
903, 908 (2006).  
57.  The Minnesota statute at issue in 281 Care Comm. has deep origins in the state’s 
history.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 625.  Minnesota began criminalizing knowingly false 
speech about political candidates in 1893.  Id.  False statements about issue-related speech were 
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III.  EIGHTH CIRCUIT FINDS LYING IN BALLOT CAMPAIGNS SHOULD BE 
SUBJECT TO HIGHEST LEVEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY 
Minnesota’s statute section 211B.06(1) prohibits false statements 
made knowingly or recklessly about both candidates and ballot questions.58  
Specifically, it states: 
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who intentionally 
participates in the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of 
paid political advertising or campaign material with respect to 
the personal or political character or acts of a candidate, or 
with respect to the effect of a ballot question, that is designed 
or tends to elect, injure, promote, or defeat a candidate for 
nomination or election of a public office or to promote or 
defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that the person knows 
is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard of 
whether it is false.59 
Three advocacy groups that opposed school funding ballot 
initiatives challenged the regulation, which falls within the Minnesota 
Fair Campaign Practices Act, on the grounds that it violated the First 
Amendment free speech guarantees.60  As a preliminary matter, the 
district court found the case non-justiciable for lack of standing and 
ripeness.61  Nonetheless, the district court addressed the merits of the case 
and concluded that the false statements prohibited by the statute fell 
outside of First Amendment protections.62  The Eighth Circuit disagreed 
with the lower court on both justiciability and the First Amendment 
question.63  While both courts spent considerable time analyzing whether 
                                                          
added to the prohibition nearly a century later.  Id.; see also Day, supra note 38, at 659 (citing 
statutes like Minnesota’s as a response to growing concerns about the effect of negative speech on 
the electoral process).  
58.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06(1) (West 2011).  
59.  Id.  
60.  281 CARE Comm. v. Arneson, No. 08-CV-5215, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at 
*1–2 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2010), rev’d and vacated, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 61 (2012); see generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 
(1995) (explaining that the First Amendment extends to state and local governments through the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
61.  Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *7, *11–12, *14–15.  
62.  Id. at *19.  
63.  281 Care Comm v. Arneson., 638 F.3d 621, 633 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).  
07. ROBERTS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2013  2:03 PM 
46 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:37 
the plaintiffs had standing and whether their claim was ripe in the absence 
of an actual prosecution,64 this Note will focus only on the First 
Amendment issues addressed by the courts. 
A.  Trial Court in 281 Care Committee Finds That Regulation of False 
Statements Made with Actual Malice Does Not Violate the  
First Amendment 
The three plaintiff groups did not specifically outline what prohibited 
statements they hoped to make,65 but they wanted to voice their opposition 
to bond initiatives that would increase school funding, and they did so by 
making statements that could be interpreted as recklessly false statements.66  
In 2006, officials investigated one of the plaintiff groups, W.I.S.E. Citizen 
Committee, after school district officials lodged a complaint with the 
Office of Administrative Hearings.67  The complaint centered around the 
use of a consultant who, immediately prior to the election, mailed voters a 
brochure using significantly lower student enrollment numbers and 
inconsistent cost figures to undermine the argument for additional school 
funding; the consultant later admitted that the figures were wrong.68  
Although the W.I.S.E. Citizen Committee was never prosecuted, an 
administrative judge found that a prima facie case of intentional falsehoods 
had been established.69  Because section 211B.06 could only be applied to 
statements of fact, not criticisms or unfavorable deductions70—a precedent 
established by a 1981 Minnesota Supreme Court case71—the administrative 
judge called an evidentiary hearing for only three of the seventeen 
                                                          
64.  Id. at 627–33; Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *5–19.  
65.  Plaintiffs argued that the law “inhibit[ed] plaintiffs’ ability to speak freely against 
these ballot initiatives” without elaborating on the kinds of statements that they wanted to make.  
281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d  at 625.  
66.  Brief for Appellant at 10–11, 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 
2011) (No. 10-1558).  
67.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 625–26 (discussing the complaint which alleged that 
the W.I.S.E. Citizen Committee had prepared and distributed campaign materials containing false 
statement of facts that it knew to be false).  
68.  Lynda Jensen, Levy Opponents Wish to Overturn False Campaign Materials Law, 
HERALD J., (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.herald-journal.com/archives/2007/stories/wise.html.  
69.  B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., No. 4-6385-17049-CV, 2006 WL 954093, at *1 (Minn. 
Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 10, 2006).  
70.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06(1) (West 2011).  
71.  Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1981).  
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statements about which there were complaints.72  An administrative panel 
later dismissed the complaint against the W.I.S.E. Citizen Committee.73 
During the following year, 281 Care Committee successfully waged a 
vigorous campaign to defeat a school funding initiative for the Robbinsdale 
Public School District.74  The campaign included a 36–second taped phone 
message to voters which implied that students from North Minneapolis, who 
were allowed to attend schools in the district through open enrollment, 
brought “problems” and were involved in “gang fights” and “bomb 
threats.”75  The superintendent said the group’s tactics were “without 
conscience” and “racist”76—a charge denied by the plaintiffs.77  In addition, 
the superintendent told the media that the school “district was investigating 
281 Care Committee and exploring ways to deal with ‘false’ information that 
it spread” during the campaign.78  That committee, along with the W.I.S.E. 
Citizen Committee and another group, challenged Minnesota statute section 
211B.06.79  The complaint asserted that the advocacy groups had a 
constitutional right to make statements that “w[ould] be interpreted by others 
as false, misleading, non-defamatory, unfavorable or unfair deductions or 
inferences.”80  After all, the primary purpose of the grassroots advocacy 
groups was “to make statements regarding the effect of ballot questions 
                                                          
72.  The three statements that were subject to an evidentiary hearing because they could be 
proved false were (1) “[District] taxpayers saw their tax support of schools shift from property 
taxes to state income taxes a few years ago,” (2) The construction contract signed by the district 
would take the district out of most decisions about the project and quality control, and (3) The 
head of W.I.S.E. had “personally been offered a bribe” by the school district’s architect.  
B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., 2006 WL 954093 at *5, *7, *9.  Other statements, however, were 
found not to merit an evidentiary hearing because they seemed to be opinions.  Those statements 
included ones like “we don’t have a growth/space problem” and others that merely questioned 
whether more construction should be done.  Id. at *3, *4.  
73.  E.g., 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 626.  
74.  Id.  
75.  Paul Levy, Robbinsdale School Official Added to Suit:  An Anti-Levy Group Said it 
Has Added the School Superintendent for Describing its Tactics as Racist, STAR TRIBUNE 
(MINN.), Nov. 10, 2007, at 7B.  
76.  Id.  North Minneapolis has seen a significant demographic shift in the last 30 years, 
with African-Americans now representing 43 percent of the population.  Kerry Ashmore, Ethnic 
Makeup Changed in North Minneapolis, DAILY PLANET (June 7, 2011), 
http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/news/2011/06/07/ethnic-makeup-changed-north-minneapolis.  
77.  Levy, supra note 75.  
78.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 626.  
79.  Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *2.  
80.  Id. at *7.  
07. ROBERTS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2013  2:03 PM 
48 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:37 
which are ‘not easily representative or supportable by fact.’”81 
In its order, the district court gave credence to the committees’ 
argument that it had a right to make statements that others might interpret 
as false.82  The order stated that such false statements would not be subject 
to prosecution under the statute83 because the law only targeted false 
statements of fact made with actual malice, not mere criticisms or 
unfavorable deductions.84  It was reasoned that “[g]ood faith or negligent 
errors of fact are protected by the First Amendment; knowing falsehoods 
are not.  The same holds true of factual errors in campaign statements.”85  
Minnesota statute section 211B.06 does not prohibit all false statements or 
even negligent ones, but only those “made with knowledge of their falsity, 
or with reckless disregard of whether they are true or false.”86  Finding that 
such regulations fell within a First Amendment categorical exemption 
already recognized by the Supreme Court, the district court held that the 
Minnesota law did not violate the U.S. Constitution.87 
In reaching its decision, the district court relied on several Supreme 
Court cases, which had held that the state could punish false statements 
made with actual malice, even in a political context.88  For example, Brown 
v. Hartlage, which challenged a Kentucky statute that prohibited candidates 
from offering a material benefit in exchange for votes,89 the Supreme Court 
determined that the statute violated the First Amendment because it lacked 
limitations.90  Yet, even as the Court in Brown held that the law was 
unconstitutional, it recognized that states have a “legitimate interest in 
upholding the integrity of the electoral process itself.”91  In considering that 
                                                          
81.  Brief of Appellant, supra note 66, at 25.  
82.  Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *7–8.  
83.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06(1) (West 2011) (identifying the limited 
circumstances under which false political speech is prohibited).  
84.  Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *8.  
85.  Id. at *9.  
86.  Id. at *8 (citing the New York Times rule).  
87.  Id. at *19.  
88.  Id. at *9–12.  
89.  Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982).  
90.  Id. at 52–62.  For example, the Court held that the state could prohibit candidates from 
promising to give voters something of value in exchange for their votes because the state was 
entitled to prevent vote-buying.  Id. at 54.  It could not, however, interpret the prohibition to include 
statements promising a public good, like committing to reduce one’s salary if elected.  Id. at 57–58.  
91.  Id. at 52.  
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interest and important First Amendment principles,92  the Supreme Court 
concluded the state could not prosecute all false statements,93 but only 
those made in bad faith or with actual malice.94  Similarly, in 281 Care 
Committee, the District Court noted that Minnesota statute section 211B.06 
contained such an appropriate limitation.95 
For similar reasons, the district court cited Garrison v. Louisiana,96 a 
ruling in which the Supreme Court extended guidelines on civil defamation 
to criminal defamation cases.97  The Court struck down Louisiana’s 
criminal defamation statute because it made no distinction between false 
statements made with ill will and those made with a reasonable belief in 
their truthfulness. 98  Still, the Garrison court noted that calculated 
falsehoods should be regarded differently, even in the context of politics: 
That speech is used as a tool for political ends does not 
automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the 
Constitution.  For the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at 
odds with the premises of democratic government and with the 
orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is 
to be effected.99 
In short, lying and democracy stand at odds with each other. 
B.  Eighth Circuit Finds No Exemption for Regulations like Minnesota’s 
Statute and Orders Law Subjected to Strict Scrutiny 
Despite the persuasive dicta in prior Supreme Court decisions, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court’s holding on the 
constitutionality of the Minnesota statute, finding such falsehoods to be 
protected by the First Amendment.100  Accordingly, the case was remanded 
                                                          
92.  Id. at 52–53.  
93.  Id. at 61.  
94.  Id. at 61–62.  
95.  Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *9.  
96.  Id. at *8.  
97.  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).  
98.  Id. at 78.  
99.  Id. at 75.  
100.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 626.  
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for analysis under a strict scrutiny test,101 and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.102 While the Eighth Circuit did not unequivocally declare the 
Minnesota statute unconstitutional,103 content-based restrictions rarely 
survive strict scrutiny, which requires a compelling state interest and a law 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.104 The Eighth Circuit rejected the 
district court’s conclusion that knowingly false speech was among the 
categories of existing exceptions—such as fighting words, obscenity, child 
pornography and defamation—which are not subject to the stringent strict 
scrutiny analysis.105 
The Eight Circuit accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that the First 
Amendment exemption for false speech made with actual malice only 
applied to defamation, not more generally to false speech.106  It held that 
the exemption for defamatory speech was not an exemption for all reckless 
or knowingly false speech.107  The court reasoned that defamation law is 
driven not only by falsehood, but by the important private interests of 
individuals whose reputations are damaged by defamatory speech.108  The 
applicability of those defamation law principles to all false political speech 
could not be assumed because not all false political speech implicates a 
private interest.109  Therefore, defamation law cannot extend to political 
speech.110 The court noted that a government entity cannot bring a 
defamation claim, and “[a] ballot initiative clearly cannot be the victim of 
character assassination.”111  Although the court acknowledged that some 
language from defamation cases could be read broadly enough to cover 
non-defamatory falsehoods, it did not examine the interests that undergird 
                                                          
101.  Id. at 636.  
102.  Arneson v. 281 Care Comm., 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).  
103.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 633–34.  
104.  Constitutional Law, supra note 12 (noting that regulations based on content are 
“strongly presumed to be invalid).  
105.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 633–34 (“We find that the Supreme Court has never 
placed knowingly false campaign speech categorically outside the protection of the First 
Amendment and we will not do so today.”).  
106.  Id. at 634–35.  
107.  Id. at 634.  
108.  Id.  
109.  Id.  
110.  Id.  
111.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 634.  
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other prohibitions against false speech.112 
The Eighth Circuit was especially reluctant to allow a First 
Amendment exemption for “quintessential political speech.”113  It noted 
that “[t]he breadth of protection afforded to political speech under the First 
Amendment is difficult to overstate.”114  In particular, the Eighth Circuit 
pointed out that earlier in 2011, the Supreme Court struck down a tort 
verdict won by the grieving father of a U.S. Marine, whose funeral was 
protested by members of a controversial anti-gay church.115  That ruling 
followed Citizens United v. Federal Elections Committee, where the Court 
struck down a ban on limiting corporate political contributions while 
emphasizing the special status of political speech under the First 
Amendment.116  The Eighth Circuit noted that “[t]he Citizens United Court 
went so far as to suggest that there may be a bright-line rule against 
restrictions on political speech.”117 
In addition, the Eighth Circuit followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit, 
which invalidated the Stolen Valor Act on First Amendment grounds.118  
The Stolen Valor Act subjected anyone who falsely claimed to have 
received a military decoration to a fine and up to one year in prison.119  In 
invalidating the law, the Ninth Circuit held that “the right to speak and 
write whatever one chooses—including, to some degree, worthless, 
offensive, and demonstrable untruths”—was an essential protection 
afforded by the First Amendment.120 
The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion affirmed the judgment, but it 
is more circumspect.121  Four justices, in a plurality opinion authored by 
Justice Kennedy, declared the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional because it 
                                                          
112.  Id.  
113.  Id. at 635.  
114.  Id. at 635 n.3.  
115.  Id.; Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).  
116.  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
117.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 635 n.3.  
118.  United States v. Alvarez (Alvarez I), 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. 
Ct. 2537 (2012). 
119.  Military Medals or Decorations, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)–(c) (2006), invalidated by 
United States v. Alvarez (Alvarez I), 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).  
120.  Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1205.  
121.  United States v. Alvarez (Alvarez II), 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality).  
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fell outside recognized exemptions to First Amendment protection.122  
Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan reasoned that the law was 
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored enough to survive 
intermediate scrutiny,123 since it applied to any false statement made about 
a military decoration at any time, whether in a political debate or at 
home.124  Furthermore, Justice Breyer said that given the broad drafting, the 
statute worked a “disproportionate constitutional harm” as the scope of the 
speech restriction was too broad for the interest that was being protected.125 
The Stolen Valor Act is distinguishable in a significant way from the 
Minnesota law.126  Minnesota statute section 211B.06 does not have the 
main drafting infirmary that plagued the Stolen Valor Act since it applies 
only to reckless and knowing falsehoods told for a specific purpose.127  
Furthermore, the Minnesota law mirrors the Ohio statute the Court cited in 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission to bolster its decision to strike 
down the prohibition on anonymous speech.128  The McIntyre court agreed 
that the state’s interest in preventing voter deception “carries special weight 
during election campaigns” and noted that the state already protected 
voters’ interests with a statute containing language much like Minnesota 
statute section 211B.06.129  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have 
agreed to consider the constitutionality of the law.130 
IV.  FALSE STATEMENTS MADE WITH ACTUAL MALICE IN BALLOT 
CAMPAIGNS SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Few people would argue that deliberate lies in political campaigns are 
                                                          
122.  Id. at 2543–47.  
123.  Id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring); see also id. at 2555 (finding the 
goal of preserving the honor of military decorations was a substantial justification but one that 
could be achieved in a less burdensome way).   
124.  Id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring); see also id. at 2547  
(Kennedy, J., plurality).  
125.  Id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring).  
126.  Compare Military Medals or Decorations, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)–(c) (2006) (subjecting 
any false statement to criminal prosecution), invalidated by United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 
1198 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 
2001) (proscribing only known and reckless falsehoods).  
127.  See § 211B.06(1).  
128.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995).  
129.  Id.  
130.  Arneson, 133 S. Ct. 61.  
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something to be celebrated or condoned,131 and in light of the risks that 
deliberate lies pose to the democratic process, the Supreme Court should 
grant states the power to prevent or remedy such lies with statutes like 
Minnesota statute section 211B.06.  Permitting limits on false campaign 
speech does not represent a departure from the court’s reluctance to curtail 
free speech.132  In fact, allowing states to enact falsehood statutes comports 
with other First Amendment exemptions—such as defamation, fraud, and 
perjury—which are already recognized by the Court.133  Based on those 
previous First Amendment carve-outs and the important interests at stake 
here, a categorical exemption should be recognized for falsehoods, told 
recklessly or knowingly, in ballot question campaigns. 
A.  Falsehoods Told with Actual Malice Do Not  
Benefit the Marketplace of Ideas 
Courts sometimes treat false speech as a participant in the 
“‘marketplace’” of ideas.134  Justice Holmes, creator of the marketplace 
metaphor, reasoned that society arrived at “ultimate good” through the free 
trade of ideas and that the “‘best test for the truth is the power of thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’”135  The well-worn 
metaphor, however, presupposes that the idea market is efficient enough to 
                                                          
131.  See generally 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(conceding that the state may have been right in describing knowing falsehoods as “often 
valueless”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).  
132.  See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and 
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.  It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas . . . .”).  
133.  See United States v. Alvarez (Alvarez II), 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (Kennedy, J., 
plurality) (noting that perjured statements are not protected under the First Amendment; United 
States v. Alvarez (Alvarez I), 617 F.3d 1198, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that historically speech 
that is fraudulent, dangerous or injurious is unprotected); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 
(holding that libelous speech has always been unprotected).  
134.  See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., 
concurring)  (“The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing 
addressees are not free to receive and consider them.  It would be a barren marketplace of ideas 
that had only sellers and no buyers.”).  
135.  BRIAN K. PINAIRE, THE CONSTITUTION OF ELECTORAL SPEECH LAW:  THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS 26 (2008) 
(citation omitted).  
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actually sort out good and bad information, the truth from a falsehood.136 
Pragmatically speaking, some false statements are inevitable,137 and 
courts have occasionally suggested they even enhance the exchange of 
ideas.138  For example, in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
said false statements are valuable because they bring “clearer the 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with 
error.”139  The Court in that case, however, was not addressing falsehoods 
told with actual malice.140  Instead, the case centered on a Civil Rights-era 
newspaper advertisement containing factual errors regarding actions 
undertaken by students and government officials at Alabama State College 
after protests by African-American students.141  The law allowed a judge to 
instruct the jury that the errors were “libelous per se”—requiring nothing 
more than proof that the statement was untrue and that it involved the 
plaintiff.142  In contrast, the Minnesota statute does not prohibit accidental 
misstatements or falsehoods that the speaker reasonably believes to be true; 
it specifically targets statements made with actual malice.143 
Marketplace proponents argue that valueless speech can be checked 
simply by putting more speech into the market,144 but that is not always the 
case.  In defamation cases, for example, the speaker’s free speech rights are 
trumped by the victim’s reputational rights because a rebuttal of falsehoods 
rarely undoes the harm caused by the lie.145  In other areas, too, social 
science has proven that people are not rational shoppers in the marketplace 
                                                          
136.  Id.  
137.  See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 48–49 (1982) (citing candidate’s mistake in 
campaign speech and later retraction); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964).  
138.  See, e.g., State of Washington ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! 
Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 695 (Wash. 1998).  
139.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19.  
140.  Id. at 285–86 (“[W]e consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks 
the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands . . . .  ”).  
141.  Id. at 258–59.  
142.  See id. at 263.  
143.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011).  
144.  See Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1211 (finding a law criminalizing speech is inconsistent with 
the First Amendment when the disfavored speech can simply be fought with more speech); 
Goldman, supra note 27, at 899 (“[T]he proper remedy for false speech is more, not less, speech.”).  
145.  See Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1210.  
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of ideas.146  Comedian Stephen Colbert dubbed the phenomenon 
“truthiness”—an intuitive “from the gut” knowledge that disregards 
evidence, logic or facts.147  It is the quality of preferring concepts or facts 
one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts known to be true.148  
Colbert was joking about then-President George W. Bush, but social 
scientists have repeatedly found “people can maintain a high degree of 
confidence in the validity of specific answers even when they know that 
their overall [accuracy] rate is not very high.”149  People balance the 
arguments for and against a particular hypothesis without sufficient regard 
for the quality of the data; this behavior “gives rise to overconfidence when 
people form a strong impression on the basis of limited knowledge.”150  
The marketplace metaphor, however, relies on a different type of decision-
making since it assumes voters in the idea market will assess facts and 
make rational decisions.151  For that to work, people must be sufficiently 
interested in and qualified to participate in an exchange driven by reason.152  
“More speech” might be an adequate solution to combat disfavored speech, 
but when used against false speech, it simply “leaves the listener with 
conflicting facts and no basis on which to discern the truth.”153 
Polling data confirms that the market does not work in the efficient 
way imagined by Justice Holmes.154  Large portions of the electorate do not 
or cannot distinguish true statements from false ones on important public 
matters, as evidenced by the University of Maryland study showing voters 
were substantially misinformed about prominent issues.155  In another poll 
                                                          
146.  See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants 
of Confidence, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 238, 
242 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).  
147.  THE COLBERT REPORT (Comedy Central television broadcast Oct. 17, 2005), 
available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/24039/october-17-2005/the-
word---truthiness.  
148.  Id.  
149.  Griffin & Tversky, supra note 146, at 247.  
150.  Id. at 242.  
151.  See PINAIRE, supra note 135, at 32.  
152.  Id.  
153.  Kruse, supra note 39, at 162; see also Alvarez II, 132 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., and 
Kagan, J., concurring) (noting that false factual statements are less likely to be valuable than true 
factual statements).  
154.  See, e.g., RAMSAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 4.  
155.  Id.  
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conducted in April 2011, Fox News found that nearly one-in-four voters 
still believed that President Barack Obama was born outside the United 
States, despite numerous stories debunking the rumor, birth 
announcements, and official state records from the President’s birth state of 
Hawaii.156  Some scholars speculate that the effect of misleading campaign 
statements may be particularly acute for less-educated, lower-income, 
minority, and women voters.157  Those voters are more likely than average 
to vote against their actual position or not at all when confused by 
misleading advertisements.158 
B.  The Risk of Chilling Legitimate Speech Is Not So Great That 
Falsehoods Told with Actual Malice Should Be Tolerated 
Beyond their faith in the marketplace of ideas, courts have expressed 
concern that proscribing false speech chills legitimate speech.159  In N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court spoke of free speech requiring 
“breathing space,” for people to speak without fearing liability for every 
misstatement.160  The grass-roots advocacy groups in 281 Care Committee 
averred that the risk of enforcement of Minnesota statute section 211B.06 
chilled their speech in elections since they wanted “to make arguments that 
[were] not grounded in facts.”161  The Eighth Circuit found the tactics used 
by the groups came close enough to reckless disregard for the truth that it 
was reasonable for them to modify their strategy.162  Similarly, challengers 
to Ohio Revised Code section 3517.22(B)163 argued that their speech was 
                                                          
156.  Blanton, supra note 45.  
157.  Kruse, supra note 39, at 131.  
158.  Id.  
159.  See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 630.  
160.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72.  
161.  281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 630.  
162.  Id.  
163.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.22(B) (West 2011) (“No person, during the course of 
any campaign in advocacy of or in opposition to the adoption of any ballot proposition or issue, by 
means of campaign material, including sample ballots, an advertisement on radio or television or in 
a newspaper or periodical, a public speech, a press release, or otherwise, shall knowingly and with 
intent to affect the outcome of such campaign do any of the following:  (1) Falsely identify the 
source of a statement, issue statements under the name of another person without authorization, or 
falsely state the endorsement of or opposition to a ballot proposition or issue by a person or 
publication; (2) Post, publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate, a false statement, 
either knowing the same to be false or acting with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, 
that is designed to promote the adoption or defeat of any ballot proposition or issue.”). 
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“tempered, chilled and/or stifled” 164 after a falsehoods complaint over 
statements in the campaign for Cincinnati’s streetcar system was filed.165  
The challengers’ argument was supported by the Attorney General of Ohio, 
who filed an amicus brief in the District Court of Ohio.166  More 
specifically, the attorney general stated that the law “fail[ed] to provide 
adequate safeguards . . . against the chilling of political speech.”167 
The risk of chilling political speech, however, has been used most 
often by the Supreme Court to explain the Court’s refusal to proscribe all 
false speech, including that which was sincerely undertaken.168  A sincere 
statement, though factually inaccurate, is one believed by the speaker to be 
true.169  On the other hand, insincere speech—a statement made with 
knowledge falsity or reckless disregard of the truth—betrays the public 
good by manipulating the debate.170  Most Americans would feel the 
government was overreaching and stifling expression if it punished people 
for sincerely made misstatements,171 and that is why the Supreme Court’s 
defamation jurisprudence holds that sincere falsehoods sometimes need to 
be protected.172 
                                                          
164.  Verified Complaint, supra note 15, at 8.  
165.  Exhibit A - Complaint at 3–5, Cincinnatians for Progress v. COAST Candidates 
PAC, No. 1:11cv775, 2012 WL 4322517 (No. 2011E-061) (detailing the 20 messages COAST 
was accused of posting on Twitter alleging that city fire services were “browned out” to pay for a 
streetcar project).  
166.  Brief of Michael DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, as Amicus Curiae and in 
Support of Neither Party, COAST Candidates PAC v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 1:11cv775, 
2012 WL 4322517 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2012).  
167.  Id. at 6.  
168.  Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1209 (2008).  
169.  Id. at 1226.  
170.  Id. at 1226, 1254.  
171.  See, e.g., Brown, 456 U.S. at 61–62 (holding that only misstatements made with 
actual malice could be proscribed by states); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (“Allowance of the defense 
of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will 
be deterred.”); see also Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1223 (“To a large degree, most of us would 
probably feel that the government was reaching too far if it punished us for innocent errors.”).  
172.  Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1225.  
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Insincere falsehoods, however, are another matter.173  Insincere 
statements do not enhance the public debate or improve voters’ ability to 
exercise their democratic rights.174  Instead, insincere falsehoods undermine 
candid and healthy policy debates by seeking to win through 
manipulation.175  Recognizing this important distinction, the Supreme 
Court in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan held that while states could not 
proscribe all falsehoods, they could regulate those told with actual 
malice.176  Protecting false statements made negligently or inadvertently 
offers enough breathing space for free speech to survive.177 
Minnesota’s law provides precisely that same breathing space to 
falsehoods in ballot campaigns.178  Minnesota statute section 211B.06 does 
not cover all falsehoods, only factual ones that are told knowingly or 
recklessly,179 and therefore does not seriously risk chilling legitimate 
speech.180 Underscoring the careful balance achieved by the law,181 it is 
important to note that neither criminal prosecutions nor state-initiated 
enforcement proceeding have resulted from Minnesota’s campaign 
falsehoods statute.182 
                                                          
173.  See, e.g., Brown, 456 U.S. at 61–62 (holding that only misstatements made with 
actual malice could be proscribed by states); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283 (holding defamation of 
public officials requires evidence of actual malice); see also Spottswood, supra note 168, at 
1225–26 (explaining that sincerity and “truth” are closely related, while an insincere statement 
does not accurately reflect the speaker’s belief).  
174.  See Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1253.  
175.  See id. at 1253–54.  
176.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.  
177.  See id. at 287–88 (finding no actual malice and at most, negligence in newspaper’s 
failure to check the accuracy of the advertisement).  
178.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011); see also 281 CARE Comm. v. 
Arneson, No. 08-CV-5215, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *19 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2010) 
(noting that only falsehoods told with actual malice are prohibited), rev’d and remanded, 638 
F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).  
179.  Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *8.  
180.  Id. at *18–19.  
181.  Id. at *11.  
182.  See id. at *11–12.  
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C.  The Supreme Court Has Long Exempted Certain Types of Speech  
From First Amendment Protection to Guard Personal and  
State Interests Deemed Sufficiently Significant. 
While the right to free speech has long been carefully protected, it has 
never been absolute.183  Few would argue that speech should always take 
precedence over other values. 184  Certain well-defined and limited 
categories of speech are prohibited and punished without raising 
constitutional problems.185  The exempted categories—including ones like 
defamation, fraud and perjury, which will be addressed here—can be 
defended because speech in these categories does not further truth or good 
public policy.186  The Supreme Court has recognized that there are some 
utterances that have “no essential part of any exposition of ideas” and are 
of such “slight social value as a step to truth” that their value is outweighed 
by other interests.187  The Court has been reluctant to create new categories 
of unprotected speech, but it has not said yet-unlisted categories cannot be 
recognized.188  Unlike in United States v. Stevens, where the government 
sought an exemption for materials that bore little resemblance to existing 
exempted categories,189 Minnesota’s prohibition on falsehoods in ballot 
campaigns shares the underlying interests and parameters for already-
recognized exemptions.190 
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that courts are particularly, 
and rightly, sensitive to prohibitions on false speech about the government 
itself.191  Efforts to prohibit slander of the government have been rare and 
controversial.192  The United States attempted to outlaw libel against the 
                                                          
183.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003).  
184.  See SAMUEL P. NELSON, BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:  THE POLITICS OF FREE 
SPEECH AND PLURALISM 41 (2005).  
185.  See id.  
186.  Id.  
187.  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  
188.  See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (refusing to recognize 
“‘depiction of animal cruelty’” as a new category of protected speech).  
189.  Id. at 1587.  
190.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2011) (outlawing perjury); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 
(1964) (discussing defamation).  
191.  See City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 88 (Ill. 1923).  
192.  See id. at 88–89 (calling the Sedition Act of 1798 the “only” effort by the United 
States to outlaw libel against the government, though the Espionage Act, as amended in May 16, 
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government in the Sedition Act of 1798, prohibiting “false, scandalous and 
malicious” statements meant to bring Congress or the President into 
contempt or disrepute.193 President Thomas Jefferson declared the act a 
“nullity,” pardoning anyone convicted under the act and remitting all 
fines.194  The few courts that have addressed the question of government 
libel have held that the government cannot make that claim.195 
However, while the government has no reputational interest that can 
be protected,196 the Supreme Court has deemed other interests that are less 
important and far-reaching than the electoral as process worthy of 
protection.197  An individual’s interest in preserving his or her reputation, 
for example, is protectable despite the First Amendment.198  The Supreme 
Court has held that states have a legitimate interest in guarding an 
“individual’s right to the protection of his own good name.”199  This, of 
course, falls within important limitations; good faith or sincerely believed 
falsehoods are not punishable while ones told in bad faith are.200  States 
must offer speakers more than a simple truth defense to pass constitutional 
muster.201  States are limited in the types of defamation laws they can use to 
                                                          
1918, made it unlawful to use “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of 
government of the United States.”).  The Supreme Court also affirmed a wartime prosecution of 
individuals who urged ammunition workers to strike by calling the president “cowardly.”  
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1919).  However, courts that have answered the 
question of whether the government can be defamed have universally concluded that a 
government entity may not sue for defamation.  J. A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, Right of 
Governmental Entity to Maintain Action for Defamation, 45 A.L.R.3d 1315 (1972).  
193.  Tribune Co., 139 N.E. at 88.  
194.  Id. at 89.  
195.  See, e.g., 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 634 (noting government has no cause of 
action for defamation); Tribune Co., 139 N.E. at 90 (holding utterances that were not designed to 
persuade others to engage in violent overthrow of the government were protected); see also 
Bryant, Jr., supra note 193.  
196.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).  
197.  See, e.g.,  Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assoc., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 623–
24 (2003) (citing choices about charitable giving as worthy of protection); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 
(citing individual reputation as a valid protectable interest).  
198.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.  
199.  Id.  
200.  See generally Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–81 (discussing the need for actual malice for 
a successful claim).  
201.  See generally id. at 279 (“‘[A]ny one claiming to be defamed by the 
communication must show actual malice or go remediless.”) (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 
98 P. 281, 285 (Kan. 1908)).  
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protect an individual’s reputational rights.202 Since the 1960s, the Supreme 
Court has generally expanded free speech rights by narrowing defamation 
protection;203 however, private individuals and public officials still enjoy 
protection against some falsehoods.204  Specifically, private individuals are 
permitted to seek remedy for these private harms.205 
By contrast, the prohibition on reckless falsehoods in ballot 
campaigns focuses on a more important interest of a “constitutional 
dimension”:206 “the integrity of the election process.”207  To start, this 
potential harm of a “constitutional dimension” is certainly weightier than 
the monetary interests protected by the exclusion of some other types of 
speech.208  While commercial speech generally enjoys less protection than 
other types of expression,209 the Supreme Court has been clear that “the 
First Amendment does not shield fraud.”210 
Even shy of fraud, states may regulate deceptive advertising.211  
Commentators suggest the latitude to proscribe such speech may be justified 
because the deceived listener is giving up money or other resources, making 
the statements akin to theft.212 Knowing or reckless falsehoods in ballot 
campaign materials may not be intended for the speaker’s pecuniary gain, 
but such falsehoods potentially impinge on a more fundamental possession: 
effective self-governance.213  Without the benefit of accurate information in 
                                                          
202.  See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (finding that states may not impose liability without fault 
and must limit damages to actual injury for private individuals); see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 
280 (finding actual malice is required for defamation of public officials).  
203.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).  
204.  See generally Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (noting the dignity and worth that is tied to an 
individual’s protection of his name).  
205.  See generally id.  
206.  Goldman, supra note 27, at 914.  
207.  Brief of Appellees at 23, 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-1558).  
208.  See Goldman, supra note 27, at 913–14.  
209.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 
557, 563 (1980).  
210.  Madigan, 538 U.S. at 612.  
211.  See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).  
212.  Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment:  A Central, Complex, and 
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1114 (2006).  
213.  See Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1232.  
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ballot campaigns, people cannot govern themselves effectively or accurately 
detect abuses by government authorities.214 
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has been willing to 
acknowledge that reputational and pecuniary interests sometimes justify 
exempting speech from First Amendment protection.  There is, however, 
another protectable interest that justifies exemption from the First 
Amendment: the integrity of governmental systems.215  Perjury—a lie, 
sometimes even one not told under oath—is a “crime against the state.”216  
It is proscribed because “[p]erjury undermines the function and province of 
the law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the basis of the 
legal system.”217  Perjury stemming from judicial proceedings requires the 
speaker to have taken an oath,218 but other laws prohibit false material 
statements with knowledge of their falsity, even without an oath.219  
Knowingly lying to or concealing information from any federal agency 
about anything material is punishable by up to five years in prison.220  
Similarly, lying to Congress about a material fact can subject someone to 
criminal charges.221  This is justifiable because “[t]he law does not seek to 
punish all lying for the sake of promoting moral virtues, but rather seeks to 
avoid the possibility that false testimony will lead to the wrong results in 
proceedings in which the life, liberty, and property of parties are at 
stake.”222  Perjury law seeks to protect the decision-making process and the 
integrity of governmental systems.223  In McGrain v. Daugherty, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress has the power to hold inquiries and 
                                                          
214.  See id.; Kruse, supra note 39, at 162 (noting that false speech confuses  
political debate). 
215.  See generally Michael D. Gordon, The Perjury Statute of 1563:  A Case History of 
Confusion, 124 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 438, 440 (1980) (noting James Endell Tyler’s conclusion 
that “history of Perjury, considered as a crime against the state . . . is full of interest”).  
216.  Id.  
217.  Alvarez II, 132 S. Ct. at 2546.  
218.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2011).  
219.  See id. at § 1621(2).  
220.  Id.  The Model Penal Code contains a similar, though less harsh, provision, 
suggesting a misdemeanor offense for intentionally misleading a public servant with a known 
false statement.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.3(1) (1962). 
221.  18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2011).  
222.  Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Perjury: “Literal Truth,” Ambiguity, and the 
False Statement Requirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 373, 430 (1990).  
223.  Id.  
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subpoena witnesses because “[a] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or 
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which 
the legislation is intended to affect or change . . . .”224 
The same can surely be said of voters in ballot question elections.  
Because voters are effectively serving as legislators when they cast their 
ballots,225 the decision-making process should be entitled to protections, just 
as Congress’ decision-making process is.226  The use of deceptive speech to 
create false evidence on important public matters, with the intent of altering 
an election, is especially dangerous.227  “It is hard to imagine a form of 
private conduct that could have broader negative impact on the state of 
public knowledge or on democratic values more generally.”228  This is 
especially true in light of social science research showing that people do a 
poor job weighing evidence.229  When people consider which of two 
hypotheses is true, the choice should depend on the degree to which evidence 
fits one hypothesis better than the other.230  However, researchers have found 
that people tend to focus on the strength of evidence for a given hypothesis 
while neglecting to consider how well the same evidence fits an 
alternative.231  Furthermore, people in political debates tend “to accept at face 
value arguments and evidence congruent with their interests and beliefs, 
while critically scrutinizing arguments and evidence that threatens those 
interests and beliefs.”232  Given that people have such metaphorical blinders 
when considering truth, allowing campaigners to knowingly inject patently 
false evidence or data into the debate cannot be in the interest of 
democracy.233 
                                                          
224.  McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).  
225.  See Coury, supra note 51.  
226.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2011).  
227.  Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1259.  
228.  Id. at 1259–60.  
229.  See Griffin & Tversky, supra note 146, at 238.  
230.  Id.  
231.  Id.  
232.  Emily Pronin et. al., Understanding Misunderstanding:  Social Psychological 
Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 637 
(Thomas Gilovich, et al. eds., 2002).  
233.  See Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1259–60.  
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D.  Legislators Should Be Permitted to Regulate  
Reckless Falsehoods about Ballot Questions Regardless of  
Logistical Challenges to Enforcement 
Those who argue against an exemption for falsehoods told in political 
campaigns, even with actual malice, contend that hyperbole and 
exaggeration are so common that it would be difficult for courts to find the 
line between truth and falsity.234  Those logistical challenges, however, 
should not prevent states from being permitted to regulate the specific class 
of speech at issue here.  Clearly, language is a complex process.235  “[T]here 
are many statements that are neither simply true nor simply false, but 
combine truth and falsity or convey shades of implied meaning that can be 
misleading.”236  Similarly, a statement might be literally true but false under 
the circumstances in which it was made.237  Yet, these same semantic 
difficulties exist for the already exempted categories of false speech, and the 
linguistic challenges do not create a constitutional barrier.238  In defamation 
cases, for example, courts parse actual falsehoods from opinions to 
determine what is actionable.239 “Worst teacher” and “very poor lawyer” are 
not actionable, while being accused of “screwing” a client might be 
actionable.240  Similarly, under perjury statutes, a witness may not be 
prosecuted if his or her statement is literally true but misleading241 or for 
implying something he or she does not believe is true.242  This required 
parsing, while inconvenient, does not make the exemptions unconstitutional; 
equally important, state election officials have already demonstrated a 
willingness to do this kind of linguistic analysis as evidenced by their desire 
                                                          
234.  See Day, supra note 38, at 662.  
235.  Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1263.  
236.  Id. at 1224.  
237.  Tiersma, supra note 222, at 374.  
238.  See generally Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973) (finding that a 
statement that it is literally true but misleading under the circumstances cannot give rise to perjury).  
239.  See generally 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION:  LIBEL, SLANDER, AND 
RELATED PROBLEMS § 4:3.5, at 4-54 to -57 (4th ed. 2010) (listing statements that do not qualify 
as defamation).  
240.  Id. at § 4:3.5, § 4-54, § 4-56, § 4:3.6, § 4-58.  
241.  See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 357–58, 362.  
242.  See id. at 357–58.  
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to limit secondary hearings to carefully distinguished factual statements.243 
Given the construction and application of these campaign falsehood 
laws, their reach will be limited.244  Many misleading and inflammatory 
statements are merely “criticism . . . or unfavorable deductions.”245  
Statements that are “extreme and illogical” will not be barred unless they 
are also factually inaccurate,246 and that limited application provides plenty 
of breathing space for free speech.247  Nonetheless, laws like Minnesota 
statute section 211B.06 allow states to set “the outward boundary of 
permissible speech and serve as a possible deterrent to misleading ads.”248 
Courts should not use logistical difficulties to prevent legislatures from 
making their best judgments about how to protect critically important 
interests, like the integrity of the democratic process.249  Concern that a 
particular legislative remedy might fail to fully mitigate the problem or might 
create new challenges is one of the paradoxes of government.250  “It is the 
price to be paid for the trial-and-error inherent in legislative efforts to deal 
with obstinate social issues.”251  In this particular case, Minnesota and other 
states have chosen to “protect the integrity of the electoral process and the 
public from the distorting influence of false speech” by proscribing 
falsehoods told with actual malice,252 and that choice should not be disturbed. 
                                                          
243.  E.g., B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., No. 4-6385-17049 –CV, 2006 WL 954093, at *3, 
*9 (Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 10, 2006) (finding a prima facie showing that merited 
an evidentiary hearing for a factual statement like the speaker had “personally been offered a 
bribe” by the school district’s architect but not for an opinion like “[w]e don’t have a 
growth/space problem”).  
244.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011) (limiting application to knowing and 
reckless falsehoods); B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., 2006 WL 954093, at *3, *9 (finding that only 
false factual statements fall under purview of the law).  
245.  Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1981).  
246.  Id.  
247.  See Kruse, supra note 39, at 133.  
248.  Id.  
249.  Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952) (“[I]t would be out of bounds for 
the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem 
and not forbidden by some explicit limitation on the State’s power.”).  
250.  Id.   
251.  Id. (upholding a law prohibiting material that subjected people to ridicule based on 
race or religion).  While Beauharnais has never been expressly overruled, the case is unlikely to 
represent good law.  Downie M. Davis, Freedom of Expression—When May the Government 
Regulate the Public Expression of Ideas, 25 LOY. L. REV. 395, 400 n.39 (1979).  
252.  Brief of Appellee, supra note 207.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
No one is suggesting that allowing states to prohibit falsehoods told 
with actual malice in ballot campaigns will, by itself, stop the spread of 
“truthiness” or prevent voters from being misinformed when they go to the 
ballot box.253  However, the democratic interests that such laws seek to 
protect are significant.254  Discussion of public issues “and the merits of 
ballot propositions is critical to our ability to govern ourselves through the 
democratic process and reach wise decisions . . . . [A]fter all, we can hardly 
be expected to govern effectively when we are relying on false 
premises.”255  When the value of reaching true conclusions rises to such 
high levels, the potential harm from believing lies becomes substantial. 256 
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has already found both 
private and public interests compelling enough to trump the First 
Amendment in narrow categories.  Falsehoods told with actual malice in 
ballot question campaigns should similarly be exempted from First 
Amendment protection in light of the significant democratic interests at 
stake. 
 
                                                          
253.  See generally RAMSAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (finding that voters were 
substantially misinformed about important issues including government bailout of the auto 
industry and economists’ view of economic stimulus spending); Blanton, supra note 45.  
254.  Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1259.  
255.  Id.  
256.  Id.  
